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These are again times when events tend to unfold faster than the human ability 
to foresee and steer them. Attempts at fitting them into pre-existing structures 
may prove elusive and even lead to unexpected drawbacks. Over 50 years ago, 
Gramsci lamented that the old order had faded while the new one was not yet 
recognisable. In his Zurich speech of 1946, Churchill called for ‘recreating the 
European fabric.’ He was followed, in 1950, by Robert Schuman who, setting 
the course for European integration, declared that ‘world peace cannot be 
ensured without creative initiatives.’ Today, we are once again ‘at the creation,’ 
as Dean Acheson then put it, with extensive new challenges and opportunities 
confronting Europe, from within and outside its borders, in political and 
economic terms.
Europe’s security: from deterrence to cooperation
The wide-open fields of globalisation and of network society compete with the 
defensive assertion of micro-identities in a relationship of mutual cause and 
effect. This apparently contradictory mixture of transnational impositions and 
self-defence reflexes, branded as ‘globalism,’ has already produced a mutation 
of the international system - an evolution of the species catalysed by economic 
diaspora criss-crossing national boundaries at will.1 ‘Global economy, local 
mayhem’ was recently the title of The Economist, though it was later added that 
‘the world economy may be on the brink of its first synchronised growth since 
the first world war.’ From its Olympus, the Davos Economic Forum agreed. 
And Karl Lamers, writing from Bonn to a French sceptic,2 argued that ‘polity 
must be oriented with respect to ...the diktat of supranational reality, namely of 
global competition; this reality offers no alternative.’ The European Monetary 
Union, when it finally happens, will consecrate the supremacy of economics 
over politics, and constitute the ultimate vindication of Monnet’s vision. 
Common Foreign and Security Policy cannot lag behind any longer.
Security matters are not immune to this grounds well. These structural 
changes involve a broader concept of stability and security, and imply a 
renovated military posture that addresses crisis prevention and management 
rather than actual war-fighting. Brushing aside the clear-cut equations of bi- 
polarism, too many variables are at play today, which defy the ability of 
individual states to control them, assuming that they are actually prepared to do 
so. Unpredictability and instability emerge as the reverse side of the 
liberalisation and démocratisation coin. Any confusion that exists is not about 
general concepts, but has more to do with the present unwillingness of 
European states to undertake international commitments after years of being 



























































































danger (not even Yugoslavia falling bloodily apart!) is perceived as sufficiently 
imminent to persuade states to do something decisively, either individually or 
through the available international mechanisms. The fact is that a process of 
domestic adjustment is under way in every European country, to the East as 
much as to the West of the former continental divide, which is not conducive to 
international security endeavours beyond the most elementary call of duty. 
Humanitarian intervention is the most that Europeans have so far been able to 
accept, in so-called ‘non Art.5’ (the former ‘out of area’) contingencies, leaving 
the Americans in charge of any peace-enforcement mission. Residual respect for 
the principle of territorial integrity, combined with a reluctance to get in harm’s 
way, may account for this. The result is that any attempt at a re-appropriation of 
specific European security responsibilities will be postponed until the tangle has 
become so intricate as to defy any effective intervention. The establishment of a 
European security policy therefore requires determination of the kind that was 
in the end lacking in 1954, when the European Defence Community failed the 
scrutiny of the French National Assembly. The situation may be much more 
favourable today than it was then, precisely because all states, big and small, are 
either unable or unwilling to go it alone in the international security field. The 
Madrid and Amsterdam summits have provided important indications to that 
effect, with the convergence of the reform processes undertaken by both NATO 
and the EU, and WEU positioning itself consequently at their intersection.
In the meantime, however, many national sensitivities, antagonistic 
trouble-spots, and national stiffnesses have re-emerged from under the Cold 
War glacier, increasing the potential of possible crises. As Yugoslavia amply 
demonstrated, addressing them early rather than waiting to contain their 
consequences in a proactive, rather than reactive, political posture is not only a 
commonsensical response but is also a way of overcoming the reluctance of 
states to intervene militarily in conflict management abroad. For the purposes of 
developing a wider concept of security, even full-fledged military means have 
been made available for non-military policing tasks. These developments also 
have blurred many distinctions, complicated the calculations of political 
analysts, and confounded the electorate. Simplistic traditional solutions are 
thrown at radically new situations, while any innovative and voluntaristic 
approach of the kind expressed in Maastricht remains buried under the rubble of 
the Soviet empire. What is more, for the first time decision makers are 
confronted with the need to involve the public fully in an extensive debate 
about national security interests and the most appropriate means of protecting 
them. While territorial defence is a self-evident constitutional duty, the 
projection of forces abroad for international solidarity or the promotion of a yet 
ill-defined international order are not, and therefore arguments to support such 




























































































a ‘democratic deficit’ in matters of security and defence, a new impetus has 
been given to multilateral formulas which has produced a renaissance of the 
universalist concept of a concert of nations, in its constant tug-of-war with the 
realist balance-of-power kind of approach.
The Wilsonian dream of a new international order, re-enacted at the San 
Francisco Conference, is therefore surfacing again. And yet, given the diffuse 
system of multiple polarities and moving targets, the UN cannot be saddled with 
the utopia of world government. Multilateral contexts must not substitute for 
nations’ responsibilities or be scapegoats for nations’ failures. They should 
constitute instead a tool that Europe has a vital interest in using to avoid sinking 
again into a national free-for-all and collective irrelevance. This time, Europe 
itself is at stake. Its Common Foreign and Security Policy ambitions may have 
been set too high at Maastricht: integration may remain elusive in defence and 
security matters where state prerogatives are still paramount. But European 
nations are aware that the challenges before them cannot be dealt with single 
handedly, and that they cannot continue to sublet their own security to the 
United States. The parameters of a European security strategy and the 
organisations to implement it already exist. But they must be rearranged, 
keeping in mind that no all-purpose solution can be devised, whilst a sense of 
direction must indicate that the European Community of nations is determined 
and able to use them, instead of giving in to isolationist or unilateralist 
tendencies. This adjustment has been termed ‘the road back to Carolingia’ (or is 
it simply to the Congress of Vienna?), involving at the same time a deepening 
of the common resolve and a widening of its solidarity. The two processes have 
different motivations, but their convergence must eventually lead to a 
recognisable common institutional framework.
In the meantime, in spite of the many invocations, no world leader is 
available and no all-purpose core group or other pre-established directoire is 
likely to emerge.3 With no barbarians at the door, these can hardly be heroic 
times; at best, explorers could venture out to the uncharted territories that 
ancient maps used to indicate with the inscription ‘hie sunt leones’ (here dwell 
lions). The adjustments that are called for, in fact, do not always imply complex 
institutional engineering. It is managers, rather than architects, that are needed 
to ensure that the behaviours of states converge. Institutional interlinkages 
ought to encourage the sharing of responsibilities rather than impose structural 
hierarchies. Improved world governance needs the contribution of Europe as a 
distinct international actor. Western Europe, apart from its NATO connection, 
already exerts a stabilising gravitational and catalytic effect, to the extent that a 
demand for Europe exists in the new democracies and in the world at large. 




























































































label accordingly. An impression of improvisation is thus spreading, with the 
recurring disputes between proponents of positive law and common law 
pragmatists, who shield from each other the commonalities of their purpose.4 
No wonder the demand for Europe has been shifted to the back-burner by 
applicants who now only queue for NATO, as if it were the cure for all ills. 
Instead, all European governments are increasingly aware that in security 
matters they will often have to fend for themselves. Even the recognised lone 
surviving superpower is reluctant and ineffective, although still able to wield its 
influence globally, aware as it is that the new multilateral conditions reduce its 
ability to shape events. Even nuclear deterrence is affected by this alteration in 
the international fabric.
Managers in demand, architects in abundance
No grand design is available for the world, and therefore for Europe, to deal 
with the transition from the Cold War situation of ‘no war, no peace’ to a 
scenario where both war and peace can coexist. Things just happen, out of 
benign neglect at best. An enlarged security concept has thus emerged, where 
military and non-military factors interplay, and threats become multifaceted and 
uncontrollable by using traditional means. No strategic thermostat is applicable. 
Confronted as we are with such multifaceted and ambiguous challenges, 
cooperative security has become a matter of participation in a preventive mode, 
with differentiated interventions tackling separately the various potential crisis 
factors, a matter of empowerment rather than of imposition. New modalities of 
cooperation are being devised that overcome the traditional concepts of national 
sovereignty, and improve interaction where gaps appear in institutional 
arrangements and intergovernmental agreements. Political mentalities must 
evolve from the automatisms of traditional security structures that can no longer 
provide for every conceivable contingency, to a more voluntaristic approach 
that brings together only the willing and able. Hard cores, and variable speeds 
and geometries are already at play, regardless of institutional arrangements. 
They must now be more coherently interconnected. In Europe, the issues of 
enlargement and institutional reform have so far monopolised attention, as if 
they could in themselves absorb the variety of conditions, perceptions, and 
aspirations liberated by the disintegration of the bipolar system. Nowadays, 
different postures characterise even the full members of Western European 
institutions. That does not prevent the quite distinct approaches and 
perspectives of Germany, Sweden, Norway, Estonia, and Poland from 
cooperating effectively in the Baltic Sea area. Elsewhere, subregional 
cooperative possibilities have not been fully explored, subordinated as they are 




























































































eventual achievements within an overall structural coherence, but they cannot in 
themselves substitute for the ad hoc coalition building that today’s multifaceted 
and ambiguous contingencies call for.
Collective defence cannot extend to every possible scenario. Nor can any 
alliance possibly establish automatic solidarities with respect to ill-defined 
scenarios.5 In non Art. 5 cooperative security contingencies, regardless of 
whether they take place in NATO or EUAVEU, decisions will be taken 
pragmatically, spurred on by events as they unfold and under the leadership of 
the most resolute and operationally involved.6 The broader continental scenario 
has been repeatedly laid out: in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and all of its 
offspring, including the Charter of Paris and the Pact on Stability in Europe; in 
the New Strategic Concept and the Enlargement Study that NATO produced 
respectively in 1991 and 1995; in the Common Concept of WEU, in 1995; in 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of Barcelona, also produced in 1995; all of 
which, the forthcoming EU Common Foreign and Security Policy will now 
somehow formally absorb as the political capital of The Fifteen. Compared to 
other geostrategic regions, Europe is overendowed with political declarations 
and institutions - the whole spaghetti-junction of them. They must not be rebuilt 
so much as allowed to interact more accurately, with their respective 
comparative advantages made more complementary and not exclusive, in a 
more coherent framework. Consultative and decision-making mechanisms must 
be readied, apart from any pre-established commitment to crisis management 
and contingency planning. A shift is occurring, among Europeans and between 
transatlantic allies, from strategic uniformity to tactical role-sharing, not only in 
terms of command and control, and logistical adjustments, but also, most 
importantly, within a broader consultative process extended to global issues, 
ranging from trade to terrorism. A mixture of multilateral, bilateral, and variable 
geometry relationships will result, as situations may suggest, tailoring responses 
to actual needs.
A spaghetti junction of institutions
In order to sustain each and all of these relationships, along with the necessary 
consensus, legitimacy, credibility, and effectiveness, their functional 
interlinkage must be improved, steering clear from a strict hierarchical 
subordination that would diminish the needed flexibility of responses. For the 
countries already members of European organisations, for those who aspire to 
membership, for those that will make it soon, and those that will not, a common 
security denominator will be provided by the interconnection of the existing 




























































































a devolution of responsibilities, that include Art.51, which spells out the right of 
individual and collective self defence, and Chapter VIII, concerning regional 
cooperation. The Security Council remains the supreme authority in matters 
concerning the use of force, which can, and increasingly does, approve 
‘enabling resolutions,’ conferring mandates to other organisations or 
associations of states better suited to addressing specific crises as they arise. In 
Europe, the following functional chain could ideally apply, which would lead to 
the re-empowering of Europe on the world scene: the OSCE would generate the 
necessary overall political consensus, in its capacity as the regional security 
organisation recognised by the UN Charter; NATO would provide the politico- 
military transatlantic link that constitutes the essential European common 
denominator; the Council of Europe would ensure the spreading out and 
observance of civil rights; the EU would provide the coherence and sense of 
purpose of an increasingly integrated community, supplemented by a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and pillar Ill’s legal and law enforcement 
provisions; the WEU, finally, would act as the instrument for specifically 
Western European political-military consultations, planning and eventual 
operations, involving other countries as needed.
And yet, today the OSCE’s overarching context is discarded as 
ineffective, the EU is confined to a purely economic role, and the WEU is 
diminished as a needless duplication of NATO. NATO’s June 1996 Berlin 
communique singles out WEU 29 times (and the Madrid Declaration 20 times), 
but mentions the EU only once in passing, thus confirming Washington’s 
reluctance to utter the two acronyms in the same breath. At a moment when 
coalition building and variable leadership are needed, NATO enlargement is 
perceived as the sole institutional remedy for political and operational 
requirements alike. In present strategic conditions and with dwindling budgets 
sacrificed to illusory peace dividends, no national Parliament would object to 
the US preserving and expanding its predominance in European security 
matters. Why try something new, if a clear-cut distinction can be drawn between 
the military and economic aspects of Europe, with NATO continuing to take 
care of the first and the EU addressing the second? Besides, the countries of 
Central Europe make NATO protection the priority - it is the simple way out 
compared with the intricate conditionalities of economic integration. But will 
the new generation of US Congressmen accept these implications? Or should 
Europe start to organise itself at the lower reaches of the security spectrum, 
concerning prevention, while keeping in store the decisive transatlantic strategic 
connection for times of real need? Besides, the two processes of EU and NATO 
reform are not linear: they must sustain and complement each other, as the new 
democracies proceed toward a consolidation involving domestic institution 




























































































Broad, preventive security does not allow pre-established scenarios and 
indiscriminate commitments. The pragmatic proactiveness and ‘ad-hocery’ that 
circumstances suggest would call instead for diversified responses, tailored to 
changing needs, and therefore promoting a ‘differentiated integration’ 
framework,7 within which an undiminished, rather than abstractly undivided, 
European security could be nurtured. This ‘separable, but not separate’ concept 
has already been enshrined in NATO doctrine. In the CFSP provisions, too, this 
distinction should be allowed: applicant countries could be accepted gradually 
into the intergovernmental second and third pillar common positions and joint 
actions, without waiting for the completion of their much stricter structural and 
economic integration into the first pillar.8 This approach would eventually lead 
to a looser relationship between Art.5 of NATO and WEU,9 without detracting 
from their inherent political and strategic interconnection. It would also ease the 
development of their respective links with other institutions and towards the 
prospective applicants for membership.
Without detracting from the specific role that other European 
organisations would be best suited to perform, the EU is particularly well suited 
for the ‘enlarged security’ tasks, not only in its present mostly civilian 
configuration, but also in its more extensive Maastricht ambitions. The 
European institutions must however all improve their networking and proactive 
relationship, to borrow formulas that are applicable to other managerial 
endeavours. No institutional obsession should be allowed to set in since, as 
Monnet used to say, ‘we are uniting people, not forming coalitions.’ Besides, 
NATO, the EU, WEU, and the OSCE, alongside the UN or the Council of 
Europe, are all presently acting for what are mainly political purposes, 
promoting consensus and convergence, national and international 
compatibilities and interlinkages, an incremental process that must not be 
allowed to turn into competing cooptations, but lead instead to aggregations and 
task-sharing.10 There is life outside and between institutions which can and 
must disaggregate in order to cope with the variable challenges of European 
reintegration.
An important development in this direction already occurred in 1991 
when, with the ‘new strategic concept’ approved at its Rome summit, NATO 
indicated that it was ready to consider responsibilities beyond territorial 
defence, thus overriding Art.5 implicit geographic constraint, that the US itself 
had originally established in order to circumscribe its military involvement in 
Europe. Washington’s present reluctance to issue a blank cheque for European 
security responsibilities in former ‘out-of-area’ contingencies is therefore 
conceivably motivated by the conviction that European initiatives not sustained 




























































































Congressional support for) the transatlantic commitment, equated so far 
primarily with the US contribution. Instead of seeking American concessions as 
a matter of principle, the Europeans should first establish the political decision­
making procedures and operational mechanisms appropriate for their own 
‘separable, but not separate’ security purposes. Only then will they be able to go 
and get from NATO the necessary supplementary assets, provided of course that 
NATO does not decide to deal with the issue itself. The two processes do not 
need to be interconnected from above, with all the relevant requests and 
concessions, devolutions of authority and institutional subordinations: they can 
proceed in parallel and in full view of each other, especially since (as is often 
overlooked in the heat of the debate) each of the ten full members of WEU is 
also a member of EU and NATO, which should in itself preclude any 
disconnection between the three organisations.
The ‘combined joint task forces’ (CJTFj concept approved at the Berlin 
Council in June 1996 constitutes a demonstration that NATO itself intends to 
diversify and choose between different formulas best designed to address hybrid 
situations. Indeed, not every security contingency ought to be dealt with by the 
full might of NATO, which may often be excessive, overshoot its target, or 
prove counterproductive." More credible forms of specifically European 
responses should therefore be prepared. The Berlin Ministerial has singled out 
the WEU to be entrusted with ‘the political control and strategic direction’ of 
any distinct European action that may need the support of the Alliance. 
Maastricht, with its Art J  4, had established the basic terms of reference for a 
European CFSP. The two must now meet.12 With the implementation of the 
CJTF provisions, either NATO or European multilateral ad hoc task-forces are 
an alternative to full-fledged NATO intervention. Their ‘double-hatting’ would 
be for unforeseeable contingencies, as would any EU/WEU general defence 
staff or other command arrangement.13 WEU would then have the means to 
assess the feasibility of a European-led military operation, determine whether it 
should be conducted under WEU leadership or under the leadership of a nation 
or nations, and advise and coordinate accordingly. Such a supplementary 
capability cannot be misconstrued as a challenge to transatlantic solidarity.
The fact that five EU Member States are not full members of WEU 
(former ‘neutrals,’ non-NATO members, or the special Danish case) should not 
in itself constitute a stumbling block, since the types of military tasks presently 
being considered by the Europeans are in the lower spectrum of security 
contingencies, which do not involve the full multilateral capability that only 
NATO can for the moment provide. The revised EU treaty presented at the 
Amsterdam Ministerial incorporates the ‘Petersberg’ cooperative security 




























































































Albania, but new opportunities will no doubt soon come up. A joint endeavour 
has been undertaken when WEU contributed to the organisation of the EU 
administrative mission in Mostar, with specific policing tasks, the result of 
which cannot be considered conclusive. The implementation of the Dayton 
civilian annexes, alongside the SFOR follow-up mission in Bosnia should 
provide ample opportunities to enhance EUAVEU operational visibility in the 
field. Clearer multilateral decision-making procedures linking EU and WEU in 
foreign policy and security matters are, however, indispensable in 
supplementing, with the appropriate political credibility, the economic 
gravitational force of the EU as well as of the individual European 
governments.
If WEU is already fully equipped and legitimised to take upon itself a 
range of military tasks,15 its political credibility and, consequently, its 
operational efficiency still depends on the interlinkage EU and NATO. It is in 
fact at the intersection of the respective reform curves that WEU will eventually 
position itself. The deepening and enlargement processes of the two 
organisations are therefore the necessary preconditions for WEU to derive 
either a new lease on life or to be grafted in the other institutional structures. So 
far it has had to stand still in practical terms, but WEU has however prepared 
generic plans for future contingencies. A WEU paper on ‘criteria and modalities 
for the effective use of CJTF’ was produced in June 1994 for NATO to 
consider; and six ‘WEU illustrative missions’ (on conflict prevention including 
monitoring, protection of humanitarian corridors, enforcement of sanctions and 
embargoes, containment, and interposition missions) were forwarded to NATO 
in 1996, as well as a more detailed document on ‘practical arrangements for 
evacuation operations.’ So far, WEU has been preparing particularly for the 
monitoring of sanctions, for the assistance in peacekeeping in Africa,16 and for 
de-mining operations.
Short of institutional integration with the EU, which the Maastricht 
process preserves as a possibility, and assuming that an operational requirement 
is presented to it (by the EU or NATO, but also by the UN or the OSCE), WEU 
has declared its readiness and willingness to proceed. Its ability to deal with the 
incremental possibilities of the Petersberg spectrum would of course need to be 
gradually tested, for purposes of operational effectiveness as well as political 
credibility. The decision making would occur in the Council, which has 
appropriately included, since 1984, both Foreign and Defence Ministers. The 
Planning Cell, Situation Centre and Intelligence Unit, supported by the Satellite 
Centre, would provide the necessary feasibility assessments and possible force­
packaging, drawing on the forces put at their disposal (FAWEUs, including the 




























































































some, not all, members) or on the CJTF provisions of NATO.
With respect to the interrelationship between EU and WEU, short of a 
full merger, two intermediate options were presented in 1995 by a WEU 
Reflection Group to the IGC: either a reinforced partnership preserving the 
autonomy of each, or a gradual convergence implying political or legal 
subordination of WEU to EU. Article J4.1 of the 1991 Treaty on European 
Union established that the CFSP ‘shall include all questions related to the 
common security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in turn lead to a common defence.’ The new Treaty 
modified that phrase to read ‘including the progressive framing of a common 
defence policy... which might lead to a common defence, should the European 
Council so decide’ (emphasis added). This represents a hesitant step back, 
relying on a Darwinian evolution of the second pillar which diminishes the 
significance of the practical EU-WEU interlinkage, the provisions of which 
seem to have also regressed: the Amsterdam Council replaced the terms 
‘requests the WEU’ with ‘will avail itself of the WEU’ (to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union). Events will, however, press 
ahead upsetting the ideal Maastricht flow-chart, as the three phases may 
develop separately and in parallel: common security actions could be 
undertaken before a common defence policy, let alone a comprehensive CFSP, 
have been worked out fully.17 No abstract conclusion can be drawn until 
sufficient experience and evidence has been built up to sustain the practicability 
of a more decisive WEU course of action. Pragmatism and feasibility will show 
some of the possible substance of things to come, but the final purpose, the 
acquis and the common commitment must be progressively reinforced, lest the 
external credibility of the whole process be greatly undermined, as well as that 
of the individual nations partaking in it.18
Coping with an enlarged security space
Deepening aspects are important, but widening aspects are even more crucial. 
As for the enlargement process, it must be underlined that, while common 
defence remains necessary for the prospective newcomers and belongs in the 
realm of NATO and WEU deepening commitments, it is cooperative security 
that is the most immediate issue of enlargement, in territorial and functional 
terms. Cooperative security relies on ad hoc, precisely tailored participation. In 
effect, it can be argued that applicants seek the enlargement of existing 
institutions more for reasons of political solidarity than for military 
interoperability. It is widely accepted that forward deployment of NATO will 




























































































reinforcement capabilities. By the same token, EU enlargement is expected to 
provide political reassurance and practical cooperation in the second (CFSP) 
and third (law and order) pillars, before the more demanding first pillar 
conditionalities are met. The expansion of EU will therefore be much more 
gradual and intricate than NATO’s, but it will have far wider socio-economic 
implications. WEU has in the meantime surged forward, developing a 
comprehensive and multilateral process of conceptual exchanges, political 
consultation and some operational cooperation between the more than 30 
countries of Europe and the Mediterranean, a process that has somewhat 
blunted the military alliance implications of the Brussels Treaty.19 The issue of a 
‘European security space’ must now be addressed by NATO, EU, and WEU in 
complementary fashion, responding to events as they actually unfold and not in 
mechanical, separate, and self-contained ways which could result in 
developments steering clear of real events. The result should not lead to abstract 
uniformity but rather to the diversification of tasks, the asymmetry of 
responsibilities and the flexibility of actual commitments that circumstances 
may demand. Common principles are more than ever indispensable; they admit 
however differentiated undertakings.
The review process of the TEU has not produced a straightforward 
insertion of national security policies into the second pillar, which most of the 
unpredictable international circumstances (apart from the sovereign 
prerogatives of states) would not warrant. Amsterdam, however, called for a 
more coherent political expression of common interests and priorities, structural 
linkages, and a clearer political solidarity. The EU Council had been entrusted 
with defining principles and general guidelines, as well as with deciding on 
common strategies (setting out objectives, duration, and means), which would 
lead - as required - to common positions (defining approach) and joint actions 
(addressing specific situations where operational action is deemed to be 
required). Against this backdrop, common operational decisions may be taken 
pragmatically, possibly involving only some of the member countries and even 
non members, on an ad hoc basis. EU will propose and stimulate; WEU will 
prepare and eventually coordinate; governments and events will decide the 
course of action. In non-Art.5 contingencies, where flexibility and multi- 
bilateral approaches are called for, no pre-established commitments can apply. 
Nor have institutionalised directoires or even permanent ‘contact groups’ 
proven possible.20 Furthermore, no institutional primacy can assert itself (with 
the sole exception of the UN Security Council), nor can formal delegations of 
authority be sought or attributed as a precondition for action.21 The basic 
principle that would apply is the opting-in of the willing, instead of the opting- 
out of the unwilling: it is in this sense that the concept of ‘constructive 




























































































will result from it, implicitly or explicitly. The decision-making mechanism 
would thus remain intergovernmental, and individual national sovereignties 
would be safeguarded. The ‘enhanced cooperations’ repeatedly invoked by 
Bonn and Paris22 would reconcile the deepening and enlarging processes. They 
would provide the flexibility clause necessary to circumvent unanimities hardly 
practicable in security issues that cannot be subjected to supranational 
enforcement. It is worth mentioning that such an escape clause from 
institutional uniformity is allowed by Art. J 7.4.23 Its inclusion in Treaty 
provisions would provide a broader political solidarity underpinning any 
practicable variable geometry. Inside the European project cooperative security 
is not simply a matter of belonging, but of participating in the work in progress, 
or sometimes stepping aside from projects that do not require the compulsory 
participation of all and cannot allow obstruction from Member States whenever 
they have no vital interests at stake in the issue at hand.
An essential element of any European security framework must of course 
be the involvement of Russia as an active participant in the common endeavour, 
with no privileged status, no veto power or droit de regard, and therefore no re­
establishment of the bipolar tutorship on European matters, which 
circumstances no longer warrant. Moscow insists that any form of NATO 
‘expansion’ must be ‘militarily neutral,’ and not involve any forward 
deployment of nuclear or other significant military hardware. Only Washington 
could nudge the Kremlin forward towards a more proactive relationship with its 
other European partners. But, after years of superpower pre-eminence, the 
United States seems equally unwilling to stoop to conquer, as it could if it 
would engage in deeper consultations with the Europeans, either in NATO or in 
OSCE.24 While retaining its function of independent common denominator of 
any European equation, Washington could play the more open role of a 
facilitator and coalition builder, and thus make the difference in any decision­
making forum. If the NATO and EU reform processes do not proceed in full 
view of each other, their mid-1997 rendez-vous may well become a pile-up of 
disparate initiatives instead of initiating the intended cross-breeding effects. In 
the meantime, WEU remains on hold: if all goes well, it would naturally find its 
place as the interface - maybe the intermediary peg - between NATO and the 
EU, and not the third party interfering with both, which many observers 
implicitly accuse it of being.
Capping it all, of course, the overriding requirement remains that of 
maintaining the indispensable linkage with public opinion through 
parliamentary process. Democratic involvement is particularly necessary in 
matters of cooperative security, where the prerogatives of the executive must be 




























































































properly fed with persuasive information, especially since the resulting 
solutions will be subjected to ratification processes and referendums.
The new security agenda for the Union
The ‘new security agenda’ is basically about stability and predictability in the 
transitional and evolutionary process affecting every nation, irrespective of 
whether or not it is a full member of security institutions. Common defence 
automaticities have been overtaken by flexible cooperative security 
arrangements, which take into consideration a much broader concept than 
simply territorial defence. The clear-cut Cold War strategic environment with 
which NATO was designed to cope, implied homogeneity of military postures 
and nuclear deterrence. The response to the heterogeneous - and at times 
ambiguous - new challenges is now more about participation, diversification, 
and persuasion.
The ‘demand for Europe’ is two-fold: it is about reintegration after years 
of forced partition; it is also about participation into a brave new world. The 
issue lies between the terms of reference that former President Giscard 
d’Estaing called ‘Europe espace’ and ‘Europe puissance.’ When power is 
sought, the knee-jerk reaction is towards the United States and NATO, the 
admission to which is the obvious quick-fix solution. Accession to the EU has 
far broader socio-economic consequences, the pinch of which is felt even by 
those who already belong to it. And yet, a European security and defence policy 
within the CFSP has become an ever-increasing requirement, especially after 
the ‘first wave’ of NATO enlargement. By developing a political visibility and a 
preventive security capability, the EU will also stimulate a participatory 
multilateralism, involving common interests more than common values, 
operating in and around existing security institutions and blurring the difference 
between the ins and the outs, thereby integrating a stabilisation process far more 
complex than military options could ever afford. The issue of whether WEU 
will eventually integrate the EU and become its security arm should not stall its 
function as a complementary instrument for the most appropriate downsizing 
and destructuring of either NATO or EU, in the many, not always foreseeable, 
circumstances that will be assessed on their own case-by-case merits.
The issue of security, stability, and crisis prevention on a continental 
European scale cannot only be a matter of belonging or not to the existing 
organisations. It should instead pursue the convergence, compatibility, and 
complementarity of different national contributions. Institutions ought to 




























































































achieved and providing it with greater coherence and political visibility, not 
project abstract solidarities or replace national responsibilities. An incremental 
process can accommodate diversity and respect specificities, while promoting 
the common wealth of behavioural principles established in the OSCE. It is 
pragmatism and flexibility rather than institutional uniformity that will be 
needed. In an international situation where challenges and risks are diverse and 
multifaceted, security reassurances can be provided by interrelating the existing 
institutions, so that even the nations that lag behind in the process of reform can 
implicitly benefit from it. A European security space already exists that blurs 
the difference between the institutional haves and have-nots.25 Pan-European 
security cannot be bestowed or imposed from above: it must be built from the 
bottom up by interlinkage and interaction of organisations and national efforts. 
Core countries and variable geometries, opt-in formulas and ad hoc 
multinational forces composed of the willing and able, whether or not they are 
members of existing institutions, will best contribute to the overriding 
requirement of an undiminished security on the continental scale. Producing 
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